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Abstract
This survey documents the different arguments discussed in the academic liter-
ature on whether and how economic inequality and the emergence and stability of
democratic political systems are connected. While early research in this domain has
often focused on new and emerging democracies, this paper also provides an overview
of the more recent literature in economics and neighboring fields that discusses de-
mocratization as well as established democracies’ stability and other institutional
traits. In doing so, the survey contains a critical review of both theoretical and empir-
ical contributions on the topic. The different arguments are systematically evaluated
and their core hypotheses are distilled in order to document the main lines of argu-
mentation prevalent in the literature. Together with a summary of the theoretical
arguments, the main findings of related empirical research are also documented and
shortly discussed. Whereas taken together, research so far generally does not suggest
any conclusive results concerning economic inequality and the emergence of democ-
racies, the survey indicates that the stability and institutional quality of established
democracies can be negatively affected by economic inequality, and it outlines the
conditions for this to occur. However, additional research especially on some of the
more tentative hypotheses is required to allow for a more profound understanding of
the different channels and relationships. Therefore, points of departure for further
research, e. g. on how to operationalize specific theoretical constructs of interest and
thereby on how to get a better understanding of the relations, are also suggested.
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JEL Classification: D63, D72
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Rising levels of economic inequality in many countries, especially in the Western world,
have led to growing interest in both the determinants of economic inequality as well as its
potential effects. Regardless of the particular inequality measure that is used, economic
inequality in developed OECD countries has increased notably in more recent decades,
with the United States demonstrating the highest levels of income inequality among the
developed nations (see Stiglitz 2012: p. 21; Merkel 2015: p. 185; EIU 2018: p. 21). Conse-
quently, the reduction of economic inequality is now considered “a defining challenge of
our time” (United Nations 2016), and has even been included as a development goal into
the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (United Nations: 2015c,
p. 1). Indeed, the issue has increasingly become the subject of many discussions in the
general public as well, as particularly exemplified by the reception of Thomas Piketty’s
2014 book Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Oftentimes, the implications of economic inequality are discussed in the context of
growth theory. In this particular area of research, the question of whether or not there
is an “optimal” level of economic inequality in terms of economic growth is one of the
oldest topics of interest. However, especially more recently, the scope has broadened and
an expanding literature is aimed at analyzing the consequences (and dependencies) of
economic inequality on politics in general and democratic systems in particular – not
merely as a means to economic growth, but as an end in and of itself. While through-
out the 20th century, many countries in Latin America, East and South Asia, Southern
and Eastern Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a process of democratization
(see Huntington 1993: p. 5; Carothers 2002: p. 5), democracy has gone through a reces-
sion during the past few years, around the globe but also in many developed countries
(see EIU 2018: p. 3). This democratic recession manifests itself in different phenom-
ena such as declining political participation, increasing dissatisfaction with government,
lacking political representation, deficiencies in government effectiveness or growing in-
fluence and pressures of unelected parties and interest groups (see EIU 2018: pp. 3, 21;
Diamond 2015: p. 152). Considering how many countries experienced a rise in economic
inequality and simultaneously a decrease in institutional measures of democratic quality,
attention has been drawn to several often interrelated questions: What is the effect of
economic inequality on the stability of democracies? Is the quality of democracies eroded
by excessive economic inequality? Is economic inequality the reason why people restrain
from democracy? Can economic inequality even trigger a change from democracy to an
autocratic regime?
While there is this recent surge in interest, the debate on the connection between
economic inequality and democracy has a long research tradition and different opinions
about the relationship1 between these variables have long been exchanged in respective
discussions. Therefore, the present survey aims at systematically reviewing and sum-
marizing the existing literature on the interrelations between economic inequality and
1Whenever the term “relationship” is used in this paper (e. g. “inequality-democratization-
relationship”), it refers to both causal directions. When the term “linkage” is used instead, emphasis
is on a specific connection in one direction, e. g. how inequality affects democracy.
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the emergence of democracy, but also between economic inequality and the stability of
democracies and the quality of their institutions. Specifically, the survey also considers
research which analyses the respective interrelations in developed countries, which often
have not been the primary interest of research on the interrelation between economic
inequality and democracy. Thereby, particular emphasis is placed on the direction that
a respective contribution under review considers for the linkages between economic in-
equality and democracy. At the same time, the survey also indicates that the relationship
may be neither simple nor unidirectional. It is important to note that, although focus is
on the economics literature owing to the authors’ academic backgrounds, contributions
from political science and other related disciplines are also considered. And indeed, many
of the more interesting arguments discussed in the survey stem from the latter branches
of the academic literature.
In order to eventually provide a well-founded overview of different arguments and ap-
proaches in the literature on the nexus between economic inequality and democracy, this
survey is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the main part of this paper, namely
an overview and systematic assessment of relevant (and particularly of more recent)
literature. Section 3 then condenses this summary by identifying the main hypotheses
and channels which are discussed in that literature. Section 4 provides a few notes on
empirics by pointing out the different aspects and dimensions that need to be consid-
ered as well as by providing a short discussion on some empirical variables relevant for
operationalization. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and provides a short outlook.
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In general, the literature on the relationship between economic inequality and democ-
racy can be grouped into two broad strands: one focuses on how economic inequality
features in the process of democratization (Subsection 2.1), and in the other branch,
primary interest lies on the stability and (potentially reduced) functionality of already
established democracies (Subsection 2.2). Naturally, arguments in the two strands are
often connected, and they often feature similar ideas: For example, an increasingly un-
stable democracy that turns into a more authoritarian regime might experience many
of the effects at work during democratization of an emerging democracy, but in reverse.
Put differently, the establishment or dissolution of a democratic regime can be consid-
ered as extreme points on the scale of democratic stability. Nonetheless, distinguishing
these two branches in the literature does allow for a better organized overview. Either
way, connections between the two branches will be pointed out wherever appropriate,
especially in the next Section 3, where the main ideas are condensed and summarized.
To provide a concise overview, empirical findings of the papers which are surveyed in
the following and their main aspects and points are documented in Tables 1 and 2 (con-
cerning democratization, Subsection 2.1) as well as Tables 3– 5 (concerning democratic
stability, Subsection 2.2) at the end of their respective subsections.2 However, caution is
2Further references as documented in the tables are to those sources as referenced in the respective
papers, and not explicitly documented in the bibliography here, unless also cited elsewhere.
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advised especially with regards to interpretations of the empirical evidence summarized
in the tables. Quite clearly, there is hardly a uniform standard which would make the
different contributions directly comparable – both in terms of their empirical methods,
and concerning the samples and specific data they use. This is a very fundamental prob-
lem indeed, as it already touches upon the question of how to measure inequality and
especially democracy (also see Section 4 on this topic). Availability of objective and reli-
able data is an especially pressing concern for earlier papers. Nonetheless, the summary
does provide an impression of what research has already been conducted, and which
hypotheses have found more support than others.
2.1 Economic inequality and democratization
One of the central ideas in the literature on the linkage from economic inequality to
democratization has been brought forward by Lipset (1959: pp. 75), who suggested that
“[a] society divided between a large impoverished mass and a small favored elite would re-
sult either in oligarchy [...] or in tyranny”. In the more recent literature, non-quantitative
research largely agrees that democracy is less likely to emerge or endure in societies with
extremely high levels of inequality (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: p. 61). However,
empirical analyses of the relationship are more scarce and often also more ambiguous,
as the following survey shows. Indeed, this has led some authors to argue in favor of
a non-relationship; and at the very least, this highlights the complexity of the research
topic at hand.
In his strongly influential book on Democracy and Redistribution, Boix (2003) claims
that there is a negative effect of inequality on democratization because the wealthy
elites in power fear the high costs of redistribution they would incur if a democratic
system was established (see Houle 2009: p. 592). Boix (2003: p. 10) argues that low
levels of economic inequality increase the chances of democratization because the ruling
elites will only accept democratization if redistribution costs are lower than the costs of
repressing the majority of citizens by maintaining authoritarian rule. The major factor
in the inequality-democratization-relationship is therefore elites’ fear of expropriation.
However, this theory only takes elites’ actions into account while neglecting any influence
of the other members of society (see Houle 2009: p. 593). To support the hypothesis that
the probability of transition depends on the level of inequality, Boix (2003: pp. 75, 79,
82) builds a dynamic probit model, including a dichotomous democracy variable and
different control variables. Based on his findings, he concludes that income inequality is
associated with a decreasing probability of transitioning to democracy. He also extends
his analysis to the related question of democratic stability and observes that inequality
also harms the endurance of democracies. Even though Boix (2003: pp. 78, 81) also
refers to reversed causality between inequality and democracy, arguing that democracy
can contribute to a reduction in economic inequality (after all, this would be the driver
behind elites’ fear of expropriation in his model), he does not include a test of the
direction of statistical causality.
In another highly relevant contribution, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: p. 37) suggest
that democratization is related to inequality by an inverted U-shaped curve. On the one
3
2 Literature survey
hand, highly equal countries are not likely to democratize because the population has no
incentive to revolt since redistribution gains are too small (see Acemoglu and Robinson
2006: p. 37; Houle 2009: p. 594). Only with sufficiently high levels of inequality within
a country, poor citizens are inclined to initiate revolutions to potentially increase their
income share (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: p. 34). On the other extreme, very high
levels of inequality correspond to immense costs of redistribution for the ruling elites
if a democracy was established. If these costs are higher than the costs of repression,
democratic tendencies will be suppressed (as in Boix 2003). Therefore, extreme economic
inequality prevents the transition to democracy (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: p. 37;
Houle 2009: p. 591). Democratization is thus most likely to occur for intermediate levels
of inequality because people are inclined to revolt as they are dissatisfied with the current
political regime and because the elite is willing to give in, with redistribution costs being
relatively low (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2006: p. 37; Houle 2009: p. 591). Acemoglu
and Robinson (2006: p. 36) also consider the possibility of a democracy backsliding
into an authoritarian regime by arguing that inequality negatively affects a democracy’s
chances to consolidate, since higher redistribution costs increase the likelihood of elites
initiating a coup against democracy. This is notably different from an earlier paper,
where Acemoglu and Robinson (2000: p. 1167) had explained the nineteenth-century
wave of democratization and associated redistribution policies as strategic decisions by
the political elite to maintain political and economic influence and to prevent social
unrest and revolution, arguing that democratization was more likely at very high levels
of inequality. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000 and 2006) do not include a statistical test
to support their models in neither of those two papers.
With their model, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) go further than Boix (2003). Ace-
moglu and Robinson (2006) consider not only the high redistribution costs of inequality
for the elites, but they also incorporate the population or what might be labeled the
demand side of this model (see Pengl 2013: p. 2). Therefore, they combine the factor
of elites’ fear of expropriation with the mechanism of potential social revolts by the
majority of citizens. However, both papers still assume that the population’s interest in
democracy stems mainly from potential economic gains, meaning that preferences such
as political efficacy are not included. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) provide another
argument, namely that democratization may come about as a result of the elites’ desire
to secure (at least some degree of) their power. As a general point of criticism of these
models, however, it should be noted that in reality, a population’s option set – especially
as a collective – is not really binary, and instead several levels of social unrest exist (see
Houle 2009: p. 594): At the very least, there is a potential middle ground between launch-
ing a revolution that overthrows the current regime, and not challenging the status quo
at all. Additionally, whereas both models also address the question of democratic stabil-
ity, they do so only fairly superficially: In Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example,
consolidation is simply their basic democratization model with a reversed sign in their
mathematical framework (see Pengl 2013: p. 3).
An important paper with regard to both, democratization and consolidation, that also
builds on Boix (2003) as well as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), is from Houle (2009).
Houle (2009: p. 591) emphasizes the need to distinguish the two concepts and depicts the
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fundamental differences between transitions to and from democracy. According to Houle
(2009), transitions to democracy can follow different paths. Similar to Boix (2003), he
states that high redistribution costs for the elites reduce the probability of democra-
tization. Additionally and related to the argument in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006),
inequality raises incentives of the population to revolt against the current political sys-
tem. Thus, depending on how the population and the elites behave, the net effect of
inequality on democratization is ambiguous (see Houle 2009: p. 593). He further argues
that transitions away from democracy are usually driven from above and not by majority
vote as it would deprive most citizens of their rights, putting them in a disadvantageous
situation. As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006: p. 225) point out as well, “the move from
democracy to dictatorship is almost never consensual”. Houle (2009: pp. 590 f., 607) em-
pirically tests his hypothesis by using a dynamic probit method similar to Boix (2003)
and by using linear and non-linear models without accounting for reversed causality.
In contrast to the previous evidence, his main findings conclude that inequality harms
consolidation, increasing the probability of a country to backslide from democracy to an
authoritarian regime, but has no net effect on democratization itself (see Houle 2009: pp.
590 f.).
Savoia et al. (2010: pp. 142 f.) address the inequality-democratization linkage by as-
sessing the implications of economic inequality on institutions in a more general sense,
i. e. as the rules that provide incentives for and constraints on actors to shape outcomes
(also see Acemoglu et al. 2005: pp. 386 f.). They consider an indirect relationship be-
tween inequality and democratization that acts via other institutions. On the one hand,
democracy creates the necessary political environment to establish efficient economic
institutions (see Savoia et al. 2010: pp. 142 f.). On the other hand, unequal societies pre-
vent the emergence of efficient institutions, thereby impeding democratization, or they
lead to inefficient and corrupt institutions with a biased distribution of resources towards
a certain social group due to rent-seeking behavior of political and business elites (see
Savoia et al. 2010: p. 143 ff.; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002: pp. 17 f.). Economic inequality
thus undermines the quality of political and economic institutions, thereby negatively
affecting democracy (see Savoia et al. 2010: p. 143). Concerning the other direction,
Savoia et al. (2010: p. 146) argue that economic inequality aggravates social conflict and
unrest over the distribution of resources, which destabilizes institutions and therefore
increases the probability of backsliding from democracy. While Savoia et al. (2010) build
their arguments on a review and analysis of different theoretical and empirical contribu-
tions, they do not conduct a separate empirical analysis. However, by explicitly including
an economy’s institutional framework, they broaden the scope of considerations on the
inequality-democratization-relationship and provide another channel through which the
two can interact.
In general, it deserves to be noted that the empirical evidence for a specific inequality-
democratization-linkage is less clear-cut than some theoretical considerations may sug-
gest. Bollen and Jackman (1985) review and analyze the interrelations between democ-
racy and economic inequality. By creating a non-recursive model using Two-Stage Least
Squares, the authors consider both causal relations and test for simultaneity and a non-
linear relationship. Bollen and Jackman (1985: p. 438) find no evidence for a statistically
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significant relationship between political democracy and income inequality in neither
direction. Muller (1988: p. 50) conducts an empirical test on the relationship between
democracy and inequality by operationalizing democracy as a concept that operates over
time via a country’s years of democratic experience. Muller (1988: p. 65) argues that new
democracies with almost no democratic “experience” and weak democratic institutions
cannot be as egalitarian as old democracies (note, however, that this inevitably presup-
poses some egalitarian effect of democracy). He first tests the relationship between years
of democratic experience and income inequality; then the interrelations between income
inequality and the stability of democracy. Stability of democracy in this context refers
to its consolidation and the likelihood of backsliding, and not to the elements determin-
ing democratic stability in established democracies. Running a point-biserial correlation
analysis, Muller (1988: pp. 61 ff.) argues against a relationship between income inequal-
ity and democratization, but for a highly negative correlation between income inequality
and consolidation based on correlation and regression analyses. Regarding the reverse
direction, his analysis reveals a significant negative effect of democracy on income in-
equality, when existing for a relatively long time (see Muller 1988: p. 50). In a later
paper, Muller (1995) analyses the linkage between economic development and democ-
racy and hypothesizes that income inequality affects democracy, which in turn negatively
affects economic development. Muller (1995: p. 966) concludes a robust negative effect
of income inequality on democratization as well as on changes in the level of democracy.
Muller (1995: p. 977) briefly refers to potential omitted-variable bias resulting from a
reciprocal relationship but dismisses this objection by simply referring to the findings
of Bollen and Jackman (1985). Barro (1999) explicitly considers different determinants
to analyze their effects on democratization, such as per capita GDP, primary schooling,
gap between male and female primary attainment, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, rule
of law, colonial history, religion, and, most relevant in this context, income inequality.
Barro (1999: p. 171) concludes that higher levels of income inequality result in lower
levels of democracy (as measured by a variable of institutional quality) with the size of
the middle class having a major impact on the extent of democracy. No separate test to
control for endogeneity is conducted.
As noted earlier, Savoia et al. (2010) point out the relevance of institutions in the
inequality-democratization-linkage. Especially in this relationship, it is clear that not
only can economic inequality affect the probability of democratization and backsliding,
but that causality can very well run in the opposite direction, too, namely that the ac-
tual level of economic inequality is a function of the political regime. Early research on
this direction stems from Lipset (1960) and Lenski (1966). Lipset (1960) focuses on the
role of elections in democracies, arguing that the majority votes for those parties that
concentrate on the interests of the working-class or middle-class (also see Bollen and
Jackman 1985: p. 438). As democracy gives franchise to the previously disadvantaged
lower-income groups and as it is based on political competition for votes, democracy in-
creases responsiveness to the preferences of the less aﬄuent citizens (see Gradstein and
Milanović 2004: pp. 517 f.). Similarly, Lenski’s (1966: pp. 44 f.) theory states that the
redistribution of political power towards the poor leads to more economic equality as the
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demands of the majority imply a more even distribution of resources, and because the
suppression of the majority of the poorer population does not comply with democratic
institutions in the long run (see Bollen and Jackman 1985: p. 439 f.). These arguments
feature in two additional channels of the inequality-democracy relationship: (1) prefer-
ences in favor of redistribution lower the level of economic inequality under democracy,
especially because (2) democracy enables political competition.
To analyze this situation, the median voter model of Meltzer and Richard (1981)
constitutes an important theoretical reference. In this model, voters’ preferences on the
ideal level of redistribution and economic inequality differ, and the tax rate represents
the magnitude of redistribution. People earning higher incomes tend to favor lower tax
rates and less redistribution, while voters with incomes below the mean income demand
higher taxes and redistribution (see Meltzer and Richard 1981: p. 924). Democratization
grants political power to those who are likely relatively poor (and given a right-skewed
income distribution, the majority earns an income below the mean), so the median
voter shifts towards poorer parts of society and advocates their higher preference for
redistribution (see Acemoglu et al. 2015: p. 1890; also see Savoia et al. 2010: p. 143).
Closely related, the model predicts the actual degree of redistribution to increase with
prevalent inequality (see Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005: p. 450). Whereas Meltzer and
Richard (1981) did not provide an empirical test of their model, it has been applied in
various empirical studies ever since.
In their comprehensive paper, Acemoglu et al. (2015: pp. 1886, 1953) build on the
median voter model, but point out where and why the democratization-inequality-linkage
may be weak. Acemoglu et al. (2015: pp. 1886 ff.) propose three potential reasons. (1)
Democracy may be “captured” by the richer parts of the population. This resembles
the discussion on democratic stability, as surveyed in Subsection 2.2. (2) In contrast
to what the median voter model suggests, democracy may be more responsive to the
preferences of the middle class, which differ from those of the poorer segments of society.
In that case, democracy does lead to increased taxes and redistribution, but not to the
extent indicated by the median voter model. (3) Democracy, at least in its early stages,
opens up disequalizing opportunities to parts of the population that were previously
excluded or disadvantaged, therefore increasing economic inequality especially early on
following democratization. As two cases in point, consider, for example, the emergence
of democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the second half of the 20th
century, which generally coincided with increases in economic inequality (see Gradstein
and Milanović 2004: p. 532; Freeman 2017: pp. 6 f.)
Yet another perspective on the democratization-inequality-linkage is provided by Ro-
drik (1999: p. 727), who argues that due to their stable institutional structure and
enforcement of the rule of law, democracies are positively associated with higher average
real wages and a larger labor share. As argued by other authors, democratic trademarks
such as free and fair elections, separation of powers and political checks and balances
contribute to political accountability, which reduces rent-seeking behavior and thus leads
to higher equality (see Savoia et al. 2010: p. 146; Barro 1999: p. 158). Accordingly, a
reduction in inequality occurs because democracy strengthens workers’ position in rela-
tion to capital owners by allowing for freedom of association and collective bargaining.
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With a bigger labor share, the part of national income that largely accrues to the higher
income shares – namely capital income – is smaller, and thus has less of an effect on
overall income inequality. Rodrik (1999: p. 708) confirms his hypothesis in cross-section
and panel regressions with country fixed effects, controlling for labor productivity, in-
come levels, and other possible influencing factors. Rodrik (1999: pp. 709, 718, 723) also
provides both empirical and historical support for the claim that causality runs from
democracy to wage levels (and thus reduced inequality).
Overall, however, empirical evidence for causality running in a particular direction
is mixed. In their review of previous work from Cutright (1967) and Jackman (1974),
Rubinson and Quinlan (1977) consider a reciprocal relationship between democracy and
income inequality in their empirical analysis. In a simultaneous equation model, Rubin-
son and Quinlan (1977: p. 611) find a negative effect of inequality on democratization but
less evidence for the hypothesis that democratization reduces inequality (also see Muller
1988: p. 50). Taken as a whole, therefore, the evidence remains inconclusive. In part,
this may be due to the primarily binary understanding of democracy as either in place
or non-existent in this line of research. Potentially, a more refined picture that allows
for differences in degree and for more diverse institutional setups, can provide further
insights. This literature that discusses the relationship between economic inequality and
democratic stability (here used as a catch-all term for different aspects related not just
to the stability, but also to the institutional quality of a democratic regime) is presented
in the following subsection.
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2.2 Economic inequality and democratic stability
As the previous subsection has shown, there is no decisive result on the inequality-
democratization-relationship that can be taken from both the theoretical and empirical
literature on the topic. To go a step further, the related – but not identical – question
of the interrelations between democratic stability and economic inequality is considered
next. With many arguments, the parallels to considerations presented in the previous
subsection will become apparent. However, it will also be clear that democratic stability
constitutes a more “zoomed-in” factor in this context: given rising economic inequality,
for example, the question of a democracy backsliding into an authoritarian regime does
not need to be binary, and instead depends on the quality of democratic institutions
(among other factors, arguably). As Crouch (2012: pp. 8 f.) points out, a democracy
will only endure if the majority of the population has the possibility to participate, e.
g. via political debates or membership in organizations, and by actively making use
of these possibilities. There are three channels through which economic inequality may
exert an influence here, and they can be described in relation to Dahl’s (1971: p. 2)
definition of democracy: “People need to articulate their preferences and communicate
them” presupposes political participation, whereas “and these preferences, in turn, need
to be equally considered by government without any discrimination” is relevant in context
of the questions of whether or not richer parts of the population have disproportionate
political influence, and how well the democratic system responds to its different citizens.
Concerning this strand of the literature, therefore, three main mechanisms by which
economic inequality affects democratic stability (and vice versa) are central to the present
survey: A disproportionate influence of wealthy elites and democratic responsiveness
(which are directly intertwined), as well as political participation in general. With regard
to the first two factors, the primary focus of research so far has been on developments
in the United States: Here, the increase in income inequality that can be observed for
developed countries since the 1970s was especially pronounced (see Piketty 2014: p. 15;
EIU 2018: p. 21), leading some observers to go as far as to state that “concentration of
income and wealth threatens to make [the United States] a democracy in name only”
(Krugman 2011). The share of total income earned by the top 0.1% or top 1% of income-
earners in the United States has increased substantially: The share going to the top 0.1%
has increased threefold from 3.3% in the late 1950s to 10.3% in 2014, and the share going
to the top 1% has doubled during the same period to 21.2% (see Bartels 2016: p. 1).
While these developments provide good reasons for the particular interest in the United
States’ democracy as one where those at the top of the income and wealth distribution
may have disproportionate political influence (as noted e. g. by Stiglitz 2012: p. xi or
Page et al. 2013: p. 51), it should nonetheless be mentioned that the United States –
and therefore, the results from respective research – might not be representative of or
directly comparable to other established democracies, e. g. in continental Europe.
In general, the core of this argument is that high levels of economic inequality translate
into imbalances in political power, therefore lowering democracy’s potential and stability
(see Dahl 1971: p. 82). Economic inequality leads to the creation and reinforcement of a
wealthy elite that can influence political decisions to their own advantage by translating
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their large share of economic resources into political resources (see Dahl 1971: p. 82;
Bollen and Jackman 1985: p. 440). Likewise, Stiglitz (2012: p. 39) theoretically elaborates
this argument by means of the term “rent-seeking” and claims that government gives
disproportionate power to those at the top of the income distribution who make use
of said power by reducing redistribution and thus further increasing their own income
share. If this happens, political inequality may reinforce economic inequality, resulting
in a democracy-threatening feedback loop (see Frank 2014). This chain of causation,
however, is hard to pin down empirically: For one, there are no statistical estimates such
as a Gini coefficient of political inequality (see Schlozman et al. 2012: p. 15). Additionally,
a disproportionate political influence of the upper classes does not necessarily translate
into different policies – indeed, it does so only to the extent that their preferences are
different from those of the rest of society.3
In the previous section, Acemoglu et al. (2015) were referenced with their argument
that democracy does not necessarily reduce economic inequality, because the political
system may be “captured”. What Acemoglu et al. (2015: p. 1887) mean is that whereas
democracy changes the distribution of de jure power to benefit poorer parts of the pop-
ulation, de facto power may remain with the wealthy classes, thus preventing redistri-
bution. Indeed, political power in a society is determined by both: political institutions
(de jure power) and the distribution of resources (de facto power; see Acemoglu et al.
2005: pp. 387, 390, 392). Wealthy elites who hold de facto political power can then use
said power outside the traditional democratic channels: For example, they can influence
politics and control political agendas by means of lobbying or repression, or through
control of local law enforcement (see Acemoglu et al. 2015: p. 1895). Furthermore, it
could be added that high income and wealth allow the respective citizens to exert politi-
cal influence via different media channels. The model implies a dynamic framework over
time: Agents with high de facto political power try to change political institutions in
order to increase their de jure political power in the future (see Acemoglu et al. 2005: p.
387) – which would endanger the democratic regime that underlies the distribution of de
jure power. On the other hand, of course, de jure political power, if successfully used for
redistribution, affects future de facto political power. It is clear how these considerations
are closely interrelated and provide further depth to the previous subsection’s notes on
the democratization-inequality-relationship (e. g. as in Boix 2003; or the references to
Acemoglu et al. 2015: p. 1888).
If the theory suggests that causality can run both ways, and the system is dynamic
over time, empirically assessing the relationship, e.g. by measuring differences in political
preferences, and whether and how high-income, wealthy individuals exert political in-
fluence, becomes especially important. In this context, the United States is a country of
primary interest, because the income and wealth distributions are not only more skewed
compared to other industrialized economies, but also, as Bartels (017a: p. 1) points out,
due to the distinctive features of its political system such as private campaign financing,
3This is not to claim that there are no such differences. As some of the literature surveyed in the
following shows, there certainly are. However, this is not a logical necessity. Empirically, too, unequal
political influence can only be demonstrated if policy preferences actually differ between aﬄuent and
poorer citizens (see Page et al. 2013: p. 67).
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weak labor unions, or the individualistic political culture.
Gilens (2005: pp. 779 ff.; also later in Aﬄuence and Influence, Gilens 2012) com-
pares data from extensive surveys recording public preferences on diverse policy issues
of different economic groups over two decades with actual outcomes of policy-making.
Respondents are categorized according to three different income groups, the lowest 10th
percentile, the middle 50th and the aﬄuent 90th percentile of income earners. In a lo-
gistic regression analysis, Gilens (2005: p. 784) regresses policy outcomes as a dummy
variable, with 1 representing change and 0 status quo, on the percentage of respondents
being in favor of the proposed change. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis
that policy corresponds more to higher-income earners’ preferences at the expense of
middle- and low-income earners, i. e. that proposals are more likely to become adopted
if they are supported by the income distribution’s top tiers (see Gilens 2005: pp. 786,
788). Gilens (2005: p. 791) also discusses the multifaceted relationship between public
preferences and government policy and theoretically elaborates why causality runs from
policy preferences of different income groups to policy outcomes.
In similar research that builds on survey data on foreign policy, Jacobs and Page (2005)
reveal a relatively small influence of the general public compared to business leaders on
U. S. foreign policy by means of cross-sectional and time-lagged analyses. Winters and
Page (2009) also analyze political influence, but do not operationalize the variable of po-
litical influence and instead simply assume that money income and wealth translate into
political power. Similar work by Bartels (2009) assesses the distinctive responsiveness of
U. S. senators by analyzing the relationship between recorded policy choices of elected
senators and the policy preferences of different income groups. Running ordinary regres-
sions and probit analyses of U. S. senators’ roll-call votes to the preferences of different
constituents reveals that senators’ policy-making corresponds more to the opinions of
high-income constituents and is less responsive to policy preferences of constituents with
modest incomes (see Bartels 2009: pp. 168 f.). On average, constituents which are located
in the upper third of the income distribution can accordingly influence senators’ general
voting patterns two times more than constituents in the middle third, whereas senators
barely consider the interests of the bottom third in decision-making (see Bartels 2009: p.
169). The general result also largely holds when controlling for other influencing factors,
such as wealthier income group’s higher tendency to vote (see Bartels 2009: pp. 183 ff.).
Page et al. (2013: p. 51) assess the political attitudes and actions of the top 1% of
U. S. wealth holders within a pilot study for the Chicago metropolitan area. While the
sample size of this survey is small, it manages to capture preferences of those at the
top of the wealth distribution better than general population surveys can. Summarizing
the results, Page et al. (2013: p. 51) conclude that the top 1% of the population is
more politically engaged and on average holds more conservative views compared to the
majority of the U. S. population. These attitudes apply to policies regarding taxation,
economic regulation and social welfare measures. However, Page et al. (2013) do not
compare their survey results with actual policy outcomes in the United States. Instead,
they run regression analyses on the relationship between economic wealth positions and
policy preferences. Thus, Page et al. (2013) provide evidence for the other component
that matters to determine whether and how disproportionate influence may shape policy
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outcomes, namely by suggesting that there are indeed discrepancies between the political
preferences of the most aﬄuent citizens as compared with the general population.
Going beyond the United States, Bartels (017a: p. 1) examines the relationship be-
tween public preferences and social spending encompassing age pensions, health, ed-
ucation, or unemployment benefits in thirty aﬄuent democracies over the past three
decades. The central hypothesis is that more aﬄuent citizens are less in favor of wel-
fare state policies than poorer ones. In order to identify preferences of different income
groups, he runs regression analyses on average levels of support for social spending poli-
cies among high- and low-income survey respondents. Shifts in social spending in the two
years following each survey serve as an indicator for policy changes (Bartels 017a: p. 15).
Bartels (017b) derives a low-income responsiveness ratio, a parameter which assesses the
relative impact that people at the lower section of the income distribution have on social
spending in each country-year; a ratio of 1 implies that the opinions of aﬄuent and poor
people are equally represented in social spending decisions, while a value of 0 implies
that poorer citizens’ opinions have no influence on social policy. Bartels (017b) tenta-
tively concludes that government’s responsiveness regarding social spending policies is
also highly biased towards more aﬄuent citizens in established democracies other than
the United States, and predicts that this biased responsiveness lowers the equilibrium
level of social spending by 10–15% (Bartels: 2017b). It should be noted, however, that
Bartels’s sample of social policies is quite small and heterogeneous, which severely limits
the possibility to draw general conclusions. Thus, much more research on other countries
and policies is necessary for a more comprehensive assessment.
Overall, this line of work therefore suggests a potentially destabilizing influence of
income inequality on democracy via the channel of responsiveness: Those at the top
of the income and wealth distribution tend to have different political preferences than
the rest of the population (at least on some matters), and they can additionally have
relatively higher political influence. These results are quite consistent, especially when
compared with the literature on democratization as presented in the previous subsec-
tion. In fact, as already indicated earlier, some authors have even argued that due to
disproportionate political influence of top income holders in the U. S., the political system
rather resembles an oligarchy instead of a democracy (see e.g. Winters and Page 2009: p.
731; also Krugman 2011, already quoted earlier). The connection with the inequality-
democratization-relationship is clear: Reduced democratic responsiveness may increase
discontent with democracy and in the extreme even ignite social revolts and a backsliding
from democracy into an authoritarian regime.
There is also research (for example Cutright 1967) on the other direction in this re-
lationship, namely from political equality and representativeness to reduced economic
inequality (similar to the arguments on how democratization may affect economic in-
equality), but the linkage from economic inequality to democratic stability is discussed
more prominently in the literature. While many of these contributions can be criticized
for not considering what determines political preferences (other than maybe income and
wealth), as e. g. argued by York (2017), it should be noted that the cause of different
political preferences is not immediately required to assess the question of, given those
differences, whether or not some citizens are able to exert more political influence. How-
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ever, further research should definitely put more focus on other conflating factors that
differ between more and less aﬄuent citizens: For example, wealthy respondents may be
better informed or have a different understanding of economic and social reality due to
differentiated access to media or education (see Page et al. 2013: p. 67).
In a democracy, economic inequality can also affect policy more indirectly, namely
by affecting political participation in general. Political participation describes citizens’
actions to influence politics (see Brady 2004: p. 669). One of the most relevant forms of
participation is voting (see Schäfer 2010: p. 137; Crouch 2012: p. 10). Other actions typi-
cally involve engaging in public debate, becoming members of political parties, attending
legal demonstrations, getting involved in campaigns or making financial contributions
for campaigns (see Verba et al. 1995: p. 2; EIU 2018: p. 63). In Europe, for example,
political participation is more present in voting, while in America it is often performed
in terms of financial campaign contributions or campaign work (see Brady 2004: p. 669).
If, for example, due to being economically marginalized, some citizens no longer actively
participate in political acts such as voting, this implies a higher influence on policy
outcomes for those citizens who are still involved in political participation. Naturally,
reduced political participation of poorer parts of the population also affects how well
they are represented in the democratic process, and therefore the ability of government
to respond to their interests (see Merkel 2015: p. 189). A reduction in voter participation
especially among the poorer parts of society thus tends to increase the disproportion-
ate impact of the well-off citizens on politics (see Page et al. 2013: p. 51; Taylor 2017).
Therefore, the effect of economic inequality in a democratic system as described before
could be even stronger due to the additional effects through this channel. Simultaneously,
when people feel that government does not respond to their needs, they may simply re-
act by withdrawing from political participation (which would constitute an effect by
which a disproportionate political influence of the wealthy leads to decreases in political
participation of the less aﬄuent). Both arguments are therefore closely interlinked.
Obviously, the linkage from inequality to political participation crucially hinges on the
question of how exactly people at the lower end of the income distribution actually behave
in terms of their political participation. Indeed, reduced activity does not need to be the
default behavior in response to increased economic inequality: Recall, for example, many
of the arguments on economic inequality and democratization as discussed in the previous
subsection, where social unrest or revolts constituted crucial components. Therefore,
different and competing claims about the connection between economic inequality and
political participation exist. The argument that economic inequality increases political
participation originates from the view that people blame politics for their bad economic
situation, therefore they mobilize themselves via voting, organizing, lobbying, protesting
and other forms of participation to counteract this situation (see Rosenstone 1982: p. 25).
In the same manner, Solt (2008: p. 49) argues from a conflict theory perspective that
inequality increases polarization among people, and therefore, increases participation
of all social groups (see Schäfer 2010: p. 136). This claim builds on the assumption
that individuals’ political preferences are shaped by their relative position in a country’s
income distribution. It argues that the preferences of richer and poorer citizens differ, and
that they differ more the higher the discrepancy is. Poorer citizens, for example, demand
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redistributive policies to improve their circumstances and to reduce their distance to the
wealthy (see Solt 2008: p. 49; Brady 2004: p. 675). They further aim to oppose the
demands of the rich who tend to vote against redistribution as redistribution costs they
would incur increase with rising inequality (Solt 2008: p. 49). Therefore, lower levels of
inequality result in fewer discrepancies in preferences and a broader consensus, and less
need for political engagement (see Solt 2008: p. 49). This claim is also supported by
Lipset (1960: p. 187): “groups subjected to economic pressures with which individuals
cannot cope, such as inflation, depression, monopolistic exploitation, or structural change
in the economy, might also be expected to turn to government action as a solution and
to show a high voting average.”
Several other arguments support the claim that economic inequality instead reduces
political participation of the less aﬄuent part of society. The relative power theory of
political engagement implies that the concentration of income and wealth translates into
political power and influence. Higher economic inequality then increases the relative
power of the more aﬄuent citizens to shape politics. This basically describes the channel
as discussed before, i. e. a disproportionate political influence of the wealthy parts of
the population. In such a situation, poorer citizens may feel that political debate does
not address their interests and give up on participating in politics (see Solt 2008: p. 48;
Galbraith 2012: p. 153). In a similar vein, Goodin and Dryzek (1980) assume that politi-
cal engagement decreases with growing inequality because the population pessimistically
assesses their chances to influence politics (see Schäfer 2010: p. 136). They refer to the
concept of political efficacy, i. e. “the feeling that individual political action does have,
or can have, an impact upon the political process” (Campbell et al. 1954: p. 187), which
determines people’s decisions to participate in politics. Citizens who feel that they can
actually influence politics tend to participate more while those who feel powerless tend
to withdraw (see Goodin and Dryzek 1980: p. 273; Brady 2004: p. 674). Another theo-
retical argument is that people who are faced with severe economic problems are under
psychological stress and more preoccupied with their personal situation. As a result,
external matters are of secondary importance and people withdraw from politics (see
Rosenstone 1982: p. 26). These factors, as argued before, would constitute an additional
channel that reinforces the same effect.
Approaching the discussion from another perspective, the resource theory implies that
economic inequality affects political participation only to the extent that it determines
the available means and resources to engage in politics (see Solt 2008: p. 50). Analogously
to a usual consumption decision, individuals engage to the degree to which they are able
and willing to pay the costs (see Solt 2008: p. 50; Brady 2004: p. 678). Higher levels
of inequality correspond to fewer resources available to the poor to pay the costs of
political engagement, therefore reducing their political participation (see Solt 2008: p.
50). Simultaneously, the resource theory implies that richer people have more resources
than less aﬄuent shares of the population, and these resources affect their personal
capacity to participate in politics (see Brady 2004: p. 675). Once again, this argument is
highly similar to those on the disproportionate political influence of wealthy citizens, but
focuses more on the question of economic resources necessary for political participation
in the first place. Verba et al. (1995: p. 11) argue in a similar fashion: if resources are
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unequally distributed, chances to get heard by decision makers differ and not everyone
can participate in the way he or she wants to.
Summarizing the different theoretical arguments, the relationship between economic
inequality and political participation can be described by the polarization argument, the
withdrawal argument, and the resource argument. Unfortunately, empirical evidence of
the linkage between economic inequality and political participation is still scarce since
studies on political engagement have often focused on cross-sectional data, which implies
that income inequality is fixed, while focusing on occupational and educational factors
as major determinants of participation (see Brady 2004: p. 14).
Rosenstone (1982: pp. 31, 33, 39) runs a probit regression analysis to model the di-
chotomous dependent variable voter turnout and incorporates several demographic vari-
ables such as household income and unemployment to estimate the partial effect of
economic adversity on voter turnout in the United States in the 1974 election and for
presidential and midterm elections between 1896 and 1980. He concludes that economic
adversity negatively affects voter turnout (see Rosenstone 1982: p. 41), i. e. supports
the withdrawal argument that less aﬄuent citizens are less politically active. Brady
(2004: pp. 644, 670) examines the effects of changes in income inequality from the 1980s
to the 1990s on unequal political participation between different income groups. He con-
cludes that no clear relationship between inequality and political participation exists
due to contradictory results (see Brady 2004: pp. 691 ff.). For example, the results dif-
fer between a time series analysis and a cross-sectional study: Analyzing participatory
inequality over time from 1970 to 1990 predicts a negative relationship; higher income
inequality is associated with decreasing participatory inequality. But when scattering
income inequality and participatory inequality across 29 states in 1985, participatory
inequality increases with increasing income inequality, suggesting a strong positive re-
lationship (see Brady 2004: pp. 692, 695). Solt (2008: p. 48) uses data from multiple
cross-national surveys of advanced industrial democracies. Variables include income,
political engagement and overall economic inequality. The multi-level regression model
reveals a strong negative relationship between income inequality and political interest,
discussion, and participation among income earners in the low and medium quintiles,
but not for the high-income quintiles, which supports the claim that income inequal-
ity effectively increases the political influence of top income earners, thus undermining
political equality (see Solt 2008: p. 57).
Goodin and Dryzek (1980) model political participation through rational choice the-
ory and expected utility calculation. One main determinant entering this calculation is
the probability of getting a net gain from the election, which is influenced by people’s
relative economic power and by the utility they gain from participating (see Goodin and
Dryzek 1980: pp. 278, 289). Running regression analyses, Goodin and Dryzek (1980: pp.
283, 287 f.) find a negative relationship between income inequality and turnout in a sam-
ple of 38 democracies around 1957 and across 42 U. S. communities in the early 1960s.
Goodin and Dryzek (1980: p. 283) further state that relative economic power strongly
determines political participation, providing additional support to the claim that eco-
nomic inequality affects democratic responsiveness. Uslaner and Brown (2005: p. 869)
suggest that economic inequality directly affects political participation, but also indi-
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rectly via its effects on trust in politics. Running a two-stage least squares analysis on
the relationship between economic inequality and trust on participation, Uslaner and
Brown (2005: pp. 868, 882, 889) find that inequality is strongly negatively related to the
level of trust. At the same time, the authors find no evidence that economic inequality
directly affects political engagement and only limited evidence that political participa-
tion depends on trust. Once more, this puts the other results on the economic inequality
democracy linkage into perspective.
Considering descriptive statistics, Galbraith (2012: p. 16) argues that U. S. states
with higher levels of inequality are associated with lower levels of voter turnout in pres-
idential elections. Galbraith (2012) also zooms in on the structure of these differences
and assesses the effects of inequality on voter turnout and the consequences for election
outcomes and party choices, i. e. he considers the geographic dispersion of richer and
poorer people in the United States and analyses associated election outcomes in support
of Democrats or Republicans. Levin-Waldman (2013: p. 83) finds that political partici-
pation increases with income so that households with higher incomes participate more in
politics, thus affecting democratic responsiveness. Overall, there is some support for the
claim that economic inequality negatively affects democratic responsiveness both due to
a disproportionate influence of the top share of the wealth and income distributions as
well as due to reduced activity by less aﬄuent citizens, but more empirical research –
especially on countries other than the United States – is necessary to get a better picture
of the linkage.
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From the various theoretical and empirical contributions presented in the previous sub-
section, ten main hypotheses on the major factors and channels connecting economic
inequality on the one hand, and democratization, democracy and democratic stability
on the other hand, can be distilled. Those can be summarized as follows, where unidirec-
tional horizontal arrows imply a predominant understanding of the way causality runs
(as per contributions in the literature), and vertical arrows document the direction of
changes (increases or decreases) of the respective variable in the chain of causation:
1. Economic inequality (↑) ⇒ fear of expropriation (↑) ⇒ democratization (↓)
High levels of inequality delay or hinder the emergence of democracies because the ruling
elites are less inclined to give in or actively endorse the transition due to the high costs
of redistribution they are likely to incur when extending political rights (see, for example,
Savoia et al. 2010: pp. 142-143; Houle 2009: p. 595; Bollen and Jackman 1985: p. 438).
2. Economic inequality (↑) ⇒ securing power (↑) ⇒ democratization (↑)
At the same time, a contrary effect may occur: High levels of economic inequality can
pressure the elites to consider and accept some degree of redistribution (political and
economical) in order to maintain political and economic influence, i. e. democratization
serves as a means to prevent revolutions and their potentially worse outcomes, such as full
expropriation (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2000: p. 1167; Savoia et al. 2010: p. 147).
3. Democratization (↑) ⇒ preferences in favor of redistribution (↑) ⇒ economic
inequality (↓)
Democratic systems grant voting rights and political power to all people, also to the pre-
viously disenfranchised and poorer segments of society. This increases the (effectively ar-
ticulated) demand for redistribution, thereby reducing inequality (see Bollen and Jackman
1985: p. 439; Savoia et al. 2010: p. 147; Acemoglu et al. 2015: p. 1890).
4. Economic inequality (↑) ⇒ social unrest (↑) ⇒ democratization (↑)
High economic inequality increases social unrest and may even ignite revolts which, to-
gether with thus articulated preferences for higher redistribution, can induce a transition
to democracy (e. g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2000: p. 1168). This argument is closely re-
lated to the first two hypotheses, but it focuses on the poorer parts of the population
instead of the wealthy elites.
5. Economic inequality (↑) ⇒ discontent with democracy (↑) ⇒ social unrest (↑) ⇒
democratic stability (↓)
High levels of economic inequality affect the stability of democracies by making people feel
disillusioned by and dissatisfied with democracy. This is accompanied by declining trust
in politics, resentment and frustration (see Dahl 1971: p. 81; EIU 2018: p. 21). Discontent
with democracy can result in social turmoil, threatening and destabilizing democracy (see
Alesina and Perotti 1996: pp. 1, 8; Savoia et al. 2010: p. 147). These arguments are evidently
very closely related to the previous hypothesis on the emergence of democracies, but they
provide a more detailed picture since they do not reduce the emergence or backsliding of
democracy to a binary event.
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6. Economic inequality (↑) ⇔ quality of institutions (↓) ⇔ democratic stability
(↓)
High levels of economic inequality lead to inefficient and corrupt institutions that give even
more advantage to the more aﬄuent, thereby increasing imbalances in political power.
Considering the reversed causality, democracy or democratic stability contribute to the
creation and preservation of economic institutions which, in turn, tend to foster economic
and political equality (see e. g. Savoia et al. 2010: pp. 142 f.). Further interrelations between
this channel and the discontent with democracy argument from the previous hypothesis
are possible.
7. Economic inequality (↑)⇔ disproportionate influence (↑)⇔ democratic respon-
siveness (↓) ⇔ democratic stability (↓)
Economic inequality leads to imbalances in political power by creating a wealthy elite that
influences political decisions to their own advantage, disadvantaging the poorer parts of the
population, which have less access to means such as lobbying etc. In other words, economic
resources are translated into political resources, which tends to violate democracy’s prin-
ciple that every citizen has the same political influence via their vote (see Dahl 1971: pp.
82 f.; Bollen and Jackman 1985: p. 440; Milanović 2018). Politics which are determined by
the interests of the wealthy can imply that the interests of large parts of the population are
not considered. This reduces the responsiveness of politics to its citizens, which, in turn,
negatively affects democratic stability. Whether or not, and to which degree, it is possible
for the more aﬄuent to exert political influence this way is also mediated by the quality
of (democratic) institutions (see the previous hypothesis).
8. Economic inequality (↑) ⇔ participation (↓) ⇔ democratic stability (↓)
Economic inequality matters for the stability of democracies because it may incline certain
population groups to reduce their political participation, which is a crucial element to any
democracy. This implies that people do not participate in elections or in the democratic
process itself. Lower political participation can threaten democratic stability as it is one
of the core components of democracy (see Crouch 2012: pp. 8 f.). What is more, this
behavior may further increase the actual political influence of wealthy elites, since it is
closely interrelated with the previous hypothesis, especially when causality running from
democratic stability to economic inequality is also considered.
9. Democracy (↑) ⇔ political competition (↑) ⇔ economic inequality (↓)
Democracy enables organized political competition among political parties. With the in-
tent to gain votes, politics is orientated towards the interests of the general population
and becomes less prone to individual pressures and nepotism (see Collier 1999: p. 191;
Bollen and Jackman 1985: p. 439). Reversing the argument, high levels of economic in-
equality distort the basis for equal political competition, therefore, reducing the quality of
democracies (see Dahl 1971: p. 103).
10. Economic inequality (↑) ⇒ polarization (↑) ⇒ democratic stability (↓) / (↑)
Economic inequality, which can be perceived as a consequence of the failure of mainstream
parties, provokes more extreme policy stances by political parties and the general public
(see Milanović 2018; Pontusson and Rueda 2008: p. 314). This may result in declining
support for mainstream political parties (see EIU 2018: pp. 3, 22). However, the effects of
polarization on democracy can also be interpreted very differently. Is polarization eroding
democracy in terms of a left-ward or right-ward shift of politics that moves away from the
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interests of the majority, or does it foster democratic stability because it creates a more
intense form of political discussion and political competition for established parties? The
overall observed effect certainly depends on the other channels at work, too.
The ten different hypotheses and the additional interrelations between them through
common variables can be summarized in two figures. Fig. 1 shows on the more general
level how democracy – including democratization processes and the backsliding into an
authoritarian regime – are connected with economic inequality. Taking a closer, more
detailed look, Fig. 2 shows the more intricately linked variables and mechanisms at play
in the relationship between economic inequality and democratic stability. In both figures,
arrows indicate the direction of causality as suggested by the hypotheses. In Fig. 1,
where the connections are easier to track, the associated (+) or (-) signs further indicate
whether the variable at the beginning of the arrow positively or negatively affects the
other variable at its end. In Fig. 2, solid arrows highlight the primarily discussed chains
of causation, whereas dashed arrows show further branches in the extensive nexus of
interrelations. The graph highlights that the interaction between economic inequality and
democratic stability is primarily mediated by the interplay of democratic responsiveness
as mutually affected by political participation and disproportionate political influence.
Additional variables, often closely related to those in the center of the figure, further
affect the relationship.
Figure 1: Interrelations between economic inequality and democracy (broad
perspective). Own illustration.
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Figure 2: Interrelations between economic inequality and democratic stability.
Own illustration.
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As the literature survey in the previous section as well as its schematic summary in
the above hypotheses and figures has shown, different contributions have highlighted
various aspects of the relationship between economic inequality and democracy, and
tackled analyzing them by different theoretical models and empirical methods. Building
on these insights, the next section provides an outline of a unified approach to empirical
research on the democracy-inequality-relationship, by taking into account the different
strands of research, and also considering what data are actually available to engage in a
comprehensive empirical analysis.
4 Cursory notes on empirics
In general and irrespective of the specific focus and particular hypothesis that is analyzed,
any empirical research on the relationship between democracy and economic inequality
needs to take four dimensions into account. The first concerns the countries of interest.
Here, a frequent distinction in the literature is between established democracies on the
one hand, and political regimes which may be prone to democratization or a backsliding
into an autocratic system on the other hand. While there may be similar forces at play
in both groups of countries, the specific factors at work arguably differ. Furthermore,
countries within both groups are far from homogeneous: There is not just one default
democratic system that is the same in every country, but indeed there are large differences
between countries. Much of the existing research on established democracies has focused
on the United States. Therefore, expanding the sample could bear considerable merit.
The second important dimension is the time frame that is considered. This is inti-
mately linked to the country sample, too: Many of today’s established democracies had
a very different institutional structure and setup over a century ago, so if that period is
considered, focus might be more on democratization than on democratic stability. What
is more, the time dimension also contains another very important aspect, namely the
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question of which time unit should be considered. When analyzing democratic regimes,
year-to-year changes may be less pronounced than changes between different legislative
periods. Furthermore and more generally, there is certainly some lag in most political
decisions, especially in a democracy. Therefore, rising economic inequality might not
bear immediate political repercussions, but it could greatly affect the next elections and
thus policies designed and put into action during the next legislative period.
The other two relevant dimensions are, of course, economic inequality and democ-
racy. Here, the problem of a proper operationalization of any related research question
becomes evident in the fact that an appropriate empirical measure of the respective
variables needs to be identified first. Concerning economic inequality, various estab-
lished measures exist which bear different implications: For example, should economic
inequality be defined as income or wealth inequality? If income inequality is the variable
of choice, post-tax income is arguably the better measure of actual inequality, but at
the same time data coverage for this variant is far less comprehensive. Furthermore, the
precise statistical measure of choice is another question. The Gini coefficient, for exam-
ple, has the advantage of condensing the whole distribution into one number, but other
measures such as percentile income shares can also provide additional insights.
For the fourth dimension – democracy – the choices to be made during operational-
ization of any empirical work on the inequality-democracy-relationship are probably the
most challenging ones. This is due to the fact that properly quantifying institutional
variables for use in empirical research is a very daunting task. And even then, finding
one that best captures the theoretical model or relationship of interest poses another
challenge. The classic measures of democracy, the Freedom House or Polity scores, for
example, differentiate between various regimes types, such as democracies and autocra-
cies, but do not allow to distinguish between different degrees of democracy (see Geissel
et al. 2016: p. 571). On the other hand, the World Bank’s World Governance Indica-
tors provide various measures of institutional quality (see Kaufmann et al. 2011; The
World Bank Group 2018). Even though the focus in this database is not on democracies,
it contains some potentially relevant variables, especially “Government Effectiveness”,
“Control of Corruption” (which can serve for proxies of disproportionate influence) and
“Voice and Accountability” (which could operationalize democratic responsiveness). An-
other useful data source could be the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence
Unit (see EIU 2017; EIU 2018; Geissel et al. 2016), with indicators such as “Functioning
of Government” (a similar category to the World Bank’s “Government Effectiveness”)
and “Political participation”. Further measures for similar theoretical ideas can be taken
from the Democracy Barometer (see Bühlmann et al. 2012; Merkel et al. 2016). Here,
the indicators “Transparency”, “Representation” and “Participation” can cover differ-
ent aspects of the inequality-democracy-relationship. Last but not least, some concepts
may of course also be operationalized by more simple variables, e. g. voter turnout.
Naturally, however, qualifying limitations need to be considered here, e. g. that author-
itarian regimes may have the highest voter turnouts due to compulsory voting (on the
predominant party).
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5 Summary and outlook
This paper has provided an overview of existing research in economics and other social
sciences on the interrelations between economic inequality and democratic political sys-
tems. Both the relationship between economic inequality and democratic stability, as
well as between economic inequality and the, as it were, extreme points of democratic
stability, namely democratization or the backsliding from democracy to an authoritar-
ian regime, were surveyed. While the review cannot constitute a clear consensus on the
research question of how economic inequality and democracy are interrelated, it has
highlighted the many different and at times opposed hypotheses that are discussed in
the literature. What is more, various empirical approaches were also discussed, which
has shown that not only are the hypotheses of interest quite varied, but so are the meth-
ods and tools employed in works aimed at empirically testing them. In order to not just
structure previous literature, but also provide avenues for further research, this survey
has particularly highlighted the challenges faced in this line of research: The relationship
between economic inequality and democracy is very complex, many channels through
which that relationship acts are prone to causality in both directions and intertemporal
dependencies, and the operationalization of theoretical constructs is a crucial task that
can be as difficult as finding the right (and available) data.
Despite the discourse in the available literature and disparities between different con-
tributions, some points stand out as notably less contested than others. For example,
the channel of economic inequality negatively affecting democratic stability respectively
democratic institutions by, for example, a disproportionate influence of richer parts of
the population and lowering democratic responsiveness and participation is frequently
supported in both theoretical and empirical contributions. Nonetheless, however, further
research, particularly more detailed empirical analyses, are crucial, especially in order
to also account for the question of pinning down a direction of causality. One poten-
tially promising avenue for further research may lie in not just broadening the scope of
countries in general (as pointed out in various contexts throughout this paper), but to
also take a closer look and consider differences within a country. This allows for an even
more zoomed-in analysis of some crucial points within a very homogeneous sample. A
clear advantage of this approach is that many factors can be held constant, especially
with regards to the institutional setup. Two prime candidates here may be the United
States of America or the Federal Republic of Germany, which feature both a uniform
federal democratic system, as well as democratic processes linked to parliaments and
governments on state levels. Due to their respective authorities and competences, the
latter may be less relevant in the context of many of the channels discussed in this sur-
vey. However, at the same time this holds the potential benefit of providing a control for
the direction of causality. Unfortunately, data availability will be a major limiting factor
for empirical analyses on this level, though.
Either way, however, it is clear that there are many open avenues for further theoretical
and empirical contributions. Considering both global developments as well as those in
many Western countries over the past years, this research promises important insights
into highly relevant questions related to pressing present issues that may well be worth
27
References
facing the challenges which need to be overcome in order to gain a better understanding
of the political implications of economic inequality.
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